Fuel Alerts — the Full Index
Every fuel alert in one map, graded by threat and pointed at its deep-dive article. Built by sweeping the abnormal-procedures chapter's triggering conditions end to end — the "severity" column shows only what is verbatim in each procedure (LAND ASAP / crew awareness / configuration actions), never an opinion.
How to use it: before a sim or a review, read the threat tiers; after an event, find the alert's row and follow the link. In flight, fly the ECAM and the QRH — this is a study index, not a procedure.
1. Threat tiers — learn the worst first
Tier 1 — LAND ASAP written in the procedure (4):
| Alert / procedure | One line | Deep dive |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL ENG 1(2) FEEDLINE BURST | feed pipe ruptured; side pumps off, crossfeed forbidden, gravity ceilings | leak & burst |
| FUEL LEAK (confirmed) | leak proven = land; the investigation happens en route | leak & burst |
| FUEL L + R WING TK LO LVL | both sides low = final notice; every pump on | quantity & level |
| ENG FUEL CONTAMINATED (confirmed) | dual-engine common cause; thrust frozen gently home | contamination |
Tier 2 — heavy reconfiguration / fuel re-planning (the bulk of Section 2).
Tier 3 — "crew awareness" (5): AFT XFR FAULT · APU LP VALVE FAULT · ENG LP VALVE FAULT · FCMC 1(2) FAULT · INNER TK HI TEMP (in flight). Awareness never means "nothing": each carries a STATUS/INOP bill — AFT XFR FAULT alone costs the cruise CG optimisation and its fuel saving.
2. The full map
Pumps → pumps / pump failures
| Alert | Trigger (precis) | Core response |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL L(R) PUMP 1(2) LO PR | one main pump low | standby took over; pump OFF |
| FUEL L(R) STBY PUMP LO PR | standby low | pump OFF; INOP aft transfer + standby |
| FUEL L(R) CTR PUMP LO PR | one centre pump | pump OFF; the other carries |
| FUEL L + R CTR PUMPS LO PR | both centre pumps | gravity transfer; <15 t unusable; 17 t MAN gate |
| FUEL L(R) WING PUMPS LO PR | a side's pumps | the fork: rupture → no crossfeed; no leak → crossfeed ON |
| L(R) FUEL GRVTY FEED ONLY | side unpowered | gravity regime: IGN, ceilings, 2 t/tank unusable |
Transfers and the trim line → transfer faults / trim unusable
| Alert | Trigger (precis) | Core response |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL OUTR TO INR FAULT | gravity transfer failed | OUTR TK XFR ON (centre pumps yield first) |
| FUEL CTR TK XFR FAULT | centre empty, pump running | pumps OFF; trim fuel's last delivery |
| FUEL CTR TO INNER FAULT | transfer anomaly / inlet stuck open | pumps OFF; condition-matched at 17 t |
| FUEL AFT XFR FAULT | aft transfer failed | awareness; false during refuelling — 3-step test |
| FUEL ABNORM MAN FWD XFR | manual FWD + pump dead + pitch >3.4°/30 s | wait or 270 kt level; never blocks rescues |
| FUEL T TANK XFR FAULT | trim transfer failed | FWD + OPEN (~1 %); ≈200 kg APU floor; recirculation → UNUSABLE |
| FUEL TRIM LINE FAULT (A) | line valve open + centre wet | JETTISON OFF → pumps OFF → reclaim |
| FUEL TRIM LINE FAULT (B) | isolation failed | deliberate ISOL + APU OFF; ground-selected recoverable |
| FUEL TRIM LINE FAULT (FUEL TRIM PUMP) | trim pump failed | gravity-only forward transfer |
| TRIM TANK FUEL UNUSABLE | the endgame | OUTR fwd shift + centre ballast; 4 h; landing trio |
| FUEL EXCESS AFT CG | CG >2.5 % behind target, 2nd FMGEC detection | per ECAM; the red-CG face |
| FUEL APU AFT PUMP FAULT | APU's normal source | APU ≤ FL250 with trim fuel |
| FUEL APU LP VALVE FAULT | valve disagrees | awareness; isolation capability check |
| FUEL MAN XFR COMPLETED | switch left on, tank empty | back to AUTO |
Quantity and level → quantity & level
| Alert | Trigger (precis) | Core response |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL L(R) WING TK LO LVL | both sensors dry 60 s (1 100–2 520 kg) | the fuel-grab; no-leak crossfeed + low-side pumps OFF |
| FUEL L + R WING TK LO LVL | all four dry 60 s | LAND ASAP; all pumps ON |
| FUEL CELL NOT FULL | collector <500 kg, pumps running | jettison OFF; no-leak crossfeed; avoid negative g |
| FUEL WING TK OVERFLOW | surge sensor wet 25 s | stop/reroute the filling transfer; 17 t resume |
| FUEL OVERREAD (QRH) | conservation shows a gain | FQI condemned; run on initial FOB − F.USED; LO LVL alerts reliable |
| FUEL F.USED/FOB DISAGREE | books differ >3 500 kg | signpost: leak drill or overread drill |
| FUEL ZFW ZFCG DISAGREE | FMGECs disagree | confirm vs loadsheet; 2 % line |
| FUEL NO WEIGHT/CG DATA | no ZFW/ZFCG | initialise |
Temperature → temperature faults
| Alert | Trigger (precis) | Core response |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL LO TEMP | inner −37 / outer −40 / trim −40 °C | check freeze point; three warm-side moves; raise TAT |
| FUEL L(R) INNER TK HI TEMP | 49 °C flight / 45 °C ground | ground JET B: delay + engine off; flight: awareness |
Computers and inerting → FCMC faults
| Alert | Trigger (precis) | Core response |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL FCMC 1(2) FAULT | one computer | awareness; changeover |
| FUEL FCMC 1+2 FAULT | both | reset → initialise → timetable 32 % / 60 t / FL250; TOGA-only (option) |
| FUEL INERTING SYS FAULT | FTIS failed | changes nothing |
Jettison → jettison / jettison faults
| Alert | Trigger (precis) | Core response |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL JETTISON FAULT | defuel valve open → self-inhibit | NOT AVAIL; hold-to-burn or overweight landing |
| FUEL JETTISON NOT CLOSED | valve won't close | OFF; confirm flow; centre pumps OFF (the 15 t bill) |
Leak and balance → imbalance / leak & burst
| Alert / procedure | Trigger (precis) | Core response |
|---|---|---|
| FUEL IMBALANCE (QRH) | crew-detected / 3 000 kg flash | leak first; crossfeed + light-side pumps off; gallery backup |
| FUEL WING X FEED FAULT | valve disagrees | stuck open: monitor; stuck closed: gallery backup ready |
| FUEL LEAK (QRH) | ten cues | isolate, watch the books, three endings; no reversers |
| FUEL LOSS REDUCTION (QRH) | leak drill recommends | manual symmetric transfers; trim ends ISOL |
| FUEL ENG FEEDLINE BURST | rupture detected | pumps off = leak stopped; ceilings; relight candidate |
Cross-chapter members
ENG FUEL CONTAMINATED (engine chapter — contamination) · ENG 1(2) LP VALVE FAULT · electrical configurations listing jettison inoperative · the false AFT XFR FAULT note (temporary-behaviour chapter).
3. Reading discipline — three rules
- This table is not a procedure. Airborne: ECAM, then QRH. The index earns its keep before (threat tiers, mechanism links) and after (find the deep dive, check the dispatch path).
- Translate "awareness" into its bill. Short procedure ≠ small consequence — read the INOP column of the STATUS page as the real content.
- Names are checkable. Every alert name above was verified against the procedure text or the maintenance documentation (the trim-pump case carries the AMM's sub-failure name FUEL TRIM PUMP); on the dispatch side, some operators' MEL prefaces its fuel chapter with an alert-to-relief-item mapping table — the fastest route from an ECAM event to the applicable dispatch conditions, including a separate family for false alerts (a failed warning chain has its own relief path, distinct from the true condition).
4. Memory hooks
- Four land-ASAPs: burst, leak, double-low, contamination.
- Three crossfeed bans: burst, contamination, unlocated leak.
- Two opposite pump moves: single low = OFF (lean), double low = ON (squeeze).
- One timetable: 32 % — 60 t — FL250 (the human FCMC).
Self-test
[!note]- Q1. Name the four procedures that write LAND ASAP. Feedline burst, confirmed fuel leak, double wing-tank low level, confirmed engine fuel contamination.
[!note]- Q2. Which three situations forbid opening the crossfeed? Feedline burst, confirmed contamination, and a leak not yet located.
[!note]- Q3. What does "crew awareness" never mean? "Nothing happened." Each awareness alert carries an INOP/STATUS bill — e.g. AFT XFR FAULT silently costs the cruise CG optimisation.
[!note]- Q4. An alert turns out to be a false warning (sensor chain failure). Does dispatch treat it like the real thing? No — false-alert cases have their own relief family in the MEL mapping, separate from the true-condition items; telling true from false is what the cross-check disciplines are for.
[!note]- Q5. Where do you read this page in the operation's timeline? Before (study, briefing) and after (review, dispatch path). Never instead of ECAM/QRH in the air.
Key takeaways
| Point | Value |
|---|---|
| Tiers | 4 × LAND ASAP / reconfiguration bulk / 5 × awareness-with-a-bill |
| Coverage | every fuel alert, each linked to its mechanism article |
| Hooks | 4 land-ASAPs · 3 crossfeed bans · 2 pump moves · 1 timetable |
| Discipline | index ≠ procedure; awareness = read the bill; names verified |
References
- FCOM PRO-ABN-FUEL (all triggering conditions, severities, procedures — swept end to end), QRH fuel section, PRO-ABN-ENG/ELEC cross-members.
- AMM 28-27-00 §7.F (alert generation definitions); some operators' MEL fuel-chapter mapping table.
- The tier grading reflects only verbatim procedure markers; groupings are editorial.
Independent study material, not an Airbus publication and not endorsed by the manufacturer. Always defer to the current operator FCOM, FCTM, and QRH for operational use.