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Pump Failures and Gravity Feed

Pump alerts run a clean escalation: one main pump is a non-event (the standby already took over), one standby pump is a dispatch problem, a whole side's pumps is a fork in the road (leak or no leak?), and at the very bottom waits the unpowered floor — gravity feed, with altitude ceilings instead of pumps. This article walks the ladder alert by alert, then the gravity-feed regime in full.


1. Single main pump — FUEL L(R) PUMP 1(2) LO PR

The standby pump starts by itself the moment a main pump's pressure drops (main fuel pumps). The ECAM procedure is accordingly one line:

PUMP (AFFECTED) ............ OFF

The engine never noticed. Dispatch afterwards: a single main pump inoperative is a conditioned MEL item (fuel margin, ETOPS restrictions by position) — the working layer of redundancy was spent, not the last one.

2. Standby pump — FUEL L(R) STBY PUMP LO PR

Same one-line drill (pump OFF), very different bill on the STATUS page: FUEL AFT XFR and the standby itself inoperative — the standby drives the wing-tank water scavenge and underwrites several transfer paths. And the dispatch line is absolute: both standby pumps must work; there is no relief. The understudy gets no understudy.

3. Centre pumps (six-tank) — one, then both

One centre pump (FUEL L(R) CTR PUMP LO PR): switch it off; the other carries the centre transfer.

Both (FUEL L + R CTR PUMPS LO PR) — the centre tank has lost its muscle:

L + R CTR PUMPS ............ OFF
WHEN EITHER INR < 17 T:
  CTR TANK XFR ............. MAN
CTR TK XFR BY GRVTY
CTR TK UNUSABLE IF < 15 T

The fallback is gravity transfer from centre to inners — but gravity only moves what sits above the outlet's level: with less than 15 tonnes in the centre tank, the remainder is unusable. The fuel-remaining arithmetic changes on the spot: usable = FOB − (centre quantity below 15 t). Trim fuel reroutes too — with the centre path degraded, forward transfer delivers directly to the inners. STATUS: centre pumps and aft transfer inoperative.

4. The fork — FUEL L(R) WING PUMPS LO PR

A whole side losing pump pressure is the alert with two opposite procedures, and the first decision is not a switch but a question: is this a feedline rupture?

◆ failure due to an engine feedline rupture:
    → the FEEDLINE BURST regime: WING X FEED — DO NOT OPEN,
      pumps OFF, gravity ceilings ([fuel leak / feedline burst](./ata-28-21-fuel-leak-feedline-burst.md))
◆ no fuel leak:
    WING X FEED ................ ON      ← the other side rescues
    PUMPS (AFFECTED SIDE) ...... OFF
    STBY PUMP (AFFECTED) ....... OFF
    → L(R) FUEL GRVTY FEED ONLY
    GRVTY FEED PROC ............ APPLY

[!warning]- Same alert, opposite crossfeed actions No leak → open the crossfeed and let the healthy side's pumps feed both engines. Rupture → the crossfeed is forbidden (it would pump the good side's fuel into the break). The leak question comes first, every time — it decides which procedure you are in.

One protection underneath: if the opposite side's main pumps are already inoperative, the ECAM logic will not ask you to switch off this side's pumps — no scenario is allowed to leave both sides unpowered at once.

5. The floor — gravity fuel feeding

Engines do not strictly need pumps: at low enough altitude, tank head pressure alone feeds them. The QRH regime:

ENG START selector .............. IGN          ← relight protection
AVOID NEGATIVE G FACTOR                        ← gravity is the only pump left
MAX ALTITUDE: GRAVITY FEED CEILING
   20 000 ft  — flight time from takeoff > 30 min
   15 000 ft  — flight time from takeoff < 30 min
    7 000 ft  — JP4 / JET B, flight time < 30 min
WHEN AT THE CEILING:
   WING X FEED ................. CLOSE         (exception: EMER ELEC config —
                                                crossfeed stays as set)
INR UNUSABLE IF < 2 000 kg (4 400 lb)

The ceiling logic is dissolved-air physics: fuel at altitude holds gas in solution; without pump pressure, climbing (or staying high) lets it come out of solution in the feed lines and vapour-lock the flow. Fuel that has been airborne longer than 30 minutes has already outgassed — hence the higher ceiling; volatile fuels (JP4/JET B) get the lowest. Continuous ignition stands guard against the flame-outs that vapour slugs can cause, and negative g is forbidden because the head pressure is the feed.

The quantity bill: each gravity-fed inner tank's last 2 000 kg is unusable — the head runs out before the tank does. Two tanks on gravity = 4 t written off the usable figure.

[!warning]- Gravity feed is an altitude decision, not just a checklist The procedure's real content is the descent: you are committing to FL200 or below (often FL150), with the range and terrain consequences that brings. The pumps failed; the strategy is altitude.


Self-test

[!note]- Q1. Why is a single main-pump failure a one-line procedure? The standby pump started automatically on the pressure drop — by the time the alert shows, the feed is already restored. The line just secures the dead pump.

[!note]- Q2. Why does the standby pump get zero dispatch tolerance when a main pump gets relief? The main has a backup (the standby); the standby is the backup — and it also drives wing water scavenge and supports transfer paths. Its loss is not compensable.

[!note]- Q3. Both centre pumps are gone with 18 t in the centre tank. How much of it can you use? Gravity transfer moves it until the centre is down to 15 t — about 3 t usable, the remaining 15 t unusable unless pumps return. Plan fuel as FOB minus the trapped amount.

[!note]- Q4. What single question splits the WING PUMPS LO PR procedure? Whether the failure is due to a feedline rupture. No leak → crossfeed ON (rescue); rupture → crossfeed forbidden, gravity regime on that side.

[!note]- Q5. Explain the three gravity ceilings. Outgassing: >30 min airborne = fuel already de-aerated → 20 000 ft; <30 min → 15 000 ft; volatile JP4/JET B <30 min → 7 000 ft. Less dissolved gas, higher safe ceiling.

Key takeaways

Point Value
Escalation main pump (non-event) → standby (no dispatch) → centre pair (15 t trap) → side group (fork) → gravity
The fork leak? crossfeed forbidden : crossfeed ON
Cross-side guard logic never de-powers both sides at once
Gravity regime IGN, no negative g, ceilings 20 000/15 000/7 000 ft
Crossfeed at ceiling CLOSE (except EMER ELEC)
Quantity bills gravity: 2 t per inner unusable; centre gravity: <15 t unusable

References

Independent study material, not an Airbus publication and not endorsed by the manufacturer. Always defer to the current operator FCOM, FCTM, and QRH for operational use.